THE WHY AND HOW OF WELFARE REFORM by Paradis, Julie
THE WHY AND  HOW OF WELFARE REFORM
Julie Paradis
Committee  on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives
Introduction
The welfare of over 30 million people across the nation has been dramatically
influenced over the last year by implementation of the welfare reform bill signed at
the end of the summer of 1996.  What drove this remarkable  legislative effort, and
how  did we reach the  requisite  critical  mass to  enact  such  a grand experiment?
Where do we go from here?
Scholars  will debate the answers  to these questions  for some time.  Let me
share with you the perspective of a Capitol Hill staffer with one of the committees of
jurisdiction.
Public Demand
In the  1992  presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton vowed to "change
welfare as we know it."  The Republican Contract With America, given much credit
for the Republican takeover of the Congress in 1994, promised massive reform of the
welfare  system.  The welfare rolls had grown dramatically between 1989 and 1994.
The average  monthly enrollment of families  in the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program had gone from 3.8 million to 5.1 million.  The average
monthly participation of individuals in the Food Stamp Program had gone from 18.8
million to 27.5 million.  Public confidence in our public assistance programs waned
and the American public rallied behind the proposition of welfare reform. At a time of
huge federal budget deficits, high unemployment and salaries not keeping pace with
inflation, the  specter  of people getting  something  for nothing-that  is, receiving
welfare  benefits but  not working,  resonated  very  unfavorably with  much of the
American electorate.
But, what did "welfare reform" mean?  What did the American public really
want?  The  devil being in the details, it took a number of attempts  and a change in
congressional leadership  to finally reach consensus;  a process that took over three
years.  The  president  sent  his  first welfare  reform  proposal,  the  "Work  and
Responsibility Act of 1994," to the Congress on June 21,  1994, a year and a half into
his  first term.  He  signed  the "Personal  Responsibility  and Work  Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996" on August 22, 1996.
The president's  1994 bill focused on the AFDC program and it would have
required  cash welfare  recipients  to enter into a contract designed to reinforce  and
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would have imposed a 5-year maximum time limit on benefits for many families, and
reduced AFDC payments to legal immigrants.  The bill would have made no changes
to the Food Stamp Program, retaining it as the ultimate safety net for poor families.
The  president's bill was intended to reform the  cash welfare  program alone.  The
estimated cost was $4.8 billion over 5 years.  Interestingly, Republican bills introduced
during the 103rd Congress were in many respects similar to the president's, and also
resulted  in cost increases-not decreases.  The president's bill was  greeted by the
Democratically-controlled  Congress with little fanfare, as the public interest groups
representing needy families expressed grave concerns over the implications of welfare
reform.  It was given a couple of committee hearings during the months remaining in
the  103rd Congress,  but  the  Democrats  lost their  last  opportunity  to  control  the
welfare reform  debate  as  the Congress was taken over by the Republicans  in the
election of November 1994.
At  that point,  the terms  of the welfare  reform  debate changed.  Budgetary
savings became an element of the debate, and the Republican majority expanded the
concept  of welfare reform to include the federal  nutrition programs  and denial of
eligibility for all public assistance programs to legal immigrants.
The original Contract With America proposal for welfare reform would have
turned  the  AFDC  program  into a  block  grant  program,  capping  spending  and
establishing a 5-year time limit on benefits.  Stringent work requirements would have
been imposed on welfare  recipients. Ten nutrition programs,  including the National
School Lunch Program and the Food Stamp Program, would have been consolidated
into  one block grant, with a cap  on funding.  Legal immigrants would have been
denied eligibility for welfare benefits.  Estimates of budgetary savings that could be
realized from this initial Republican offering ranged from $40 billion to $57 billion over
5 years.
Significant changes  to this bill were  made by  several  of the  committees  of
jurisdiction  as  it worked  its way  through  the  legislative process.  The  proposed
reforms  to the  cash welfare  program,  AFDC, were  largely unchanged,  and  legal
immigrants  saw no improvement in the provisions denying them program eligibility.
The reforms of  the nutrition programs, however, were scaled back, and the underlying
structures  of those programs  retained;  they were  not block  granted.  Widespread
public support of the  National  School Lunch Program, tapped by the Democratic
minority, eroded Republican support for block granting and capping that program.
The Republican  leadership  of the House Committee  on Agriculture persuaded  the
House leadership to back away from the concept of turning the Food Stamp Program
over to the states in block grant form, arguing that as welfare programs were returned
to the states, it was important for the Food Stamp Program to provide a federal social
safety  net.
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committees also realized that the upcoming farm bill legislation to reauthorize most of
USDA's  programs, including the Food Stamp Program, would need the traditional
support of members from urban districts.  Because the Food Stamp Program plays a
critical role in the support of the many poor families living in these urban districts,
such  urban support would be eroded if the Food Stamp  Program had been block
granted.  Instead, the program was reformed  to discontinue  most of the automatic
benefit  increases  that  resulted from  adjustments  for inflation,  to  impose  limited
eligibility on able-bodied individuals between  the ages of 18 and  50 who have no
dependents,  and to enhance USDA's ability to curtail program fraud and abuse.
The bill vetoed by the president in December 1995 would have block granted
and capped cash welfare, provided a $1 billion contingency  fund, imposed a 5-year
lifetime limit on cash benefits, provided $9.9 billion for child care for welfare families,
imposed a family cap, and restricted eligibility for Medicaid.  It would have denied
legal immigrants eligibility for all public assistance programs.  It would have reduced
food stamp benefits by eliminating cost of living adjusters and denying eligibility to
unemployed able-bodied individuals between the ages of 18 and 50 who are without
dependents.  The  bill  signed  by the  president  in  August  1996  increased  the
contingency  fund to $2  billion and child care funding to $13.9  billion.  It  greatly
expanded Medicaid  coverage  beyond what would have been permitted  under the
vetoed bill.
Balancing  the  Budget
For many years, federal policy has often been driven by budget considerations.
Nowhere has this been more obvious than in the debate over welfare  reform.
Both the president and the Republican leadership had committed to balancing
the  federal budget  in seven  years.  The Republicans  decided that welfare  reform
should be made a part of the budget process.  Over time, this decision drove up the
welfare  savings,  and  insulated  these  program  funding  reductions  from  some
opposition.  Controversial legislation  is more likely to pass if it is included in an
omnibus budget bill that members are likely to support.
Indicative of  the determination to use welfare reform as a means to help balance
the budget was the  fact that the  decisions  on the  legal immigrant provisions were
made at the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee-
committees with jurisdiction over revenue and public moneys matters-rather than
at the committees with jurisdiction over the various public assistance programs.  The
denial of public benefits to legal immigrants provided a significant percentage of the
overall savings of welfare reform.
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targets  were  imposed.  These  targets  became  more  difficult  to achieve  with  the
subsequent  decision that the  nutrition programs  would not be sent to the  states as
block grants with funding caps.  The governors urged the Congress to maintain the
then current  funding  levels  for  cash  welfare,  and President  Clinton  eventually
succeeded in getting additional funding for child care for the children of parents who
would be moved to the workforce under welfare reform.  These concessions required
that additional  savings  be  found  in the food  stamp  provisions  and the  provisions
denying eligibility to legal immigrants, but they also made it virtually impossible for
opponents  of the  food  stamp  and  legal  immigrant  provisions  to  prevail.  Those
opponents  could not overcome the impact of the  savings targets.
The original welfare reform bills of 1994, designed to help people on welfare
achieve economic self-sufficiency, would have actually cost taxpayers money.  The
final welfare reform bill signed in August of 1996 saved over $54 billion.
Different  Players
For the first time in decades, liberal Democrats and advocates for the poor had
only a marginal  impact  on  welfare  program  changes.  State  governors  wielded
unprecedented power over welfare reform deliberations.
Traditionally, the three entities that have most influenced welfare policy have
been  advocates  for the  poor,  state  program  administrators,  and  federal  program
administrators.  During the welfare reform debate,  governors or their representatives
were  frequently  consulted by  the  congressional  majority,  while  discussions  with
anti-poverty groups and Democratic members and staff were very infrequent.
After  the  president  vetoed  the  first welfare  reform  bill,  officials  of the
administration negotiated legislation acceptable to the Republican leadership of the
Congress  and the  president.  A channel  to  the administration  gave  congressional
Democrats  somewhat more input than they had enjoyed in the earlier debate.
Reform  Modifications
As popular as  the  concept of welfare  reform  is,  reaching  agreement  on its
specifics was  not easy and may not yet be  over.  Although  the second welfare  bill
sent to the president was acceptable  to him, it was not acceptable to several of his
welfare  advisors; three of them quit the administration over the decision to sign the
bill.  In fact, when the president signed the measure, he promised that he would seek
legislation to ameliorate  what he perceived were its harshest provisions.
The administration's budget proposal for fiscal year 1998 would have provided
funding for a welfare-to-work program, restored Supplemental  Security Income (SSI)
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impact of a number of food stamp  reforms,  and  restored Medicaid  eligibility  for
certain children who lost SSI eligibility.
A stronger than anticipated economy allowed several of these proposals to be
included in the recently enacted Balanced Budget Act (BBA).  Signed by the president
on August 5, 1997, it will increase direct federal spending  over 5 years on welfare
programs and the Food Stamp Program by almost $15  billion.
The BBA establishes a 2-year program of welfare-to-work grants for recipients
of the cash welfare  program.  Grants will be allocated  to states to be used  for job
creation, on the job training, contracts with public or private providers of readiness,
placement, and post employment services, job vouchers, and job retention or support
services.  Eligible  entities  for these  grants  are private  industry councils,  political
subdivisions,  or private entities.  Seventy percent of the funds must be used for the
benefit of long-time  recipients with specified  barriers  to employment  or who are
about to lose their benefits due to the 5-year time limit on program participation.  This
grant program will cost $2.7 billion.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) has been restored by the BBA for elderly
and disabled legal aliens. This restored SSI eligibility automatically renews Medicaid
eligibility for these aliens.  These provisions will restore approximately $1  1 billion in
benefits  over 5 years.
The Food Stamp Act was amended by the BBA to provide additional funding
to states to establish employment  and training slots for childless able-bodied  18 to
50 year old recipients who are in danger of losing food stamp eligibility because they
have been unable  to find employment.  Those recipients placed  in one of the new
slots will retain food stamp eligibility. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated
that these provisions will cost $1.5 billion.
A  number of  proposals  to modify welfare  reform  have not  yet  found  the
requisite  level  of support to  be  enacted.  Perhaps  the  proposal  with  the  highest
profile  in this regard  is one  requested  by  several  states to  exempt  cash  welfare
workfare recipients from the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
other labor laws.  The Clinton administration has determined that the FLSA requires
that cash welfare recipients in workfare jobs be compensated, with their cash welfare
benefits, at no less than the minimum wage.  In other words, these recipients cannot
be made  to work for their benefits for more hours than their  benefits will support
relative to the minimum wage,  in spite of the fact that welfare reform requires  that
they work at least 20 hours per week.  The Republican Congress tried to include the
exemption  requested  by  states  in  the  BBA,  but Democratic  members  and the
administration  (supported by organized labor) resisted, and the provision was  not
included in the bill signed by the president.  Further attempts to enact this exemption
are expected.
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participation  in the Food Stamp  Program.  Advocates  for non-citizens  continue  to
work for reinstatement of  food stamp eligibility for this group. At a minimum, eligibility
is being sought for the children of legal aliens and those who are elderly or disabled.
This proposal was included in bipartisan nutrition legislation, which was introduced
in the House of Representatives  on April 30, 1997.  It was intended to restore funding
reduced by welfare reform.  This bill, the "Hunger Has A Cure Act of 1997," would
cost greater than $7 billion over 5 years.
Advocacy  Focus
The failure of another proposed welfare reform modification to be included in
the BBA demonstrates  the increasing  focus of anti-poverty advocates  at the  state
level,  given  the  broad  discretion  granted  to the  states by  welfare  reform.  That
proposed modification would permit states to administer welfare programs  and the
Food  Stamp  Program  through  contracts  with  charitable,  religious  or private
organizations.  Welfare reform would permit such a contract  to administer the cash
welfare  program,  but the  statutory  authority  for the  Food  Stamp  and  Medicaid
programs  requires  that  eligibility  for those  programs  be determined  by  a public
official, a requirement  not contemplated  by an  expansive  view  of the concept of
privatization.
For  many  months,  the  state  of Texas  sought  the approval  of the  Clinton
administration  for a waiver to permit it to hire a private corporation  to administer
Temporary Assistance  for Needy Families  (TANF), the Food Stamp Program  and
Medicaid.  Believing  that it did not have the  statutory  authority  to grant such  a
waiver,  the  administration  rejected  Texas'  request.  The  Texas  congressional
delegation  sought to include a provision  in the Balanced Budget Act to permit the
Texas project to go forward. The administration,  strongly backed by the AFL-CIO
and government unions, opposed this legislative  effort.
Meanwhile,  groups representing  welfare recipients  in the state of Texas had
persuaded  the Texas legislature  that the privatization proposal warranted  a second
look. Although Texas claimed that such a contract, valued at $2 billion over 5 years,
could save the state $100 million per year, local opponents cited the cost over-runs
of similar  government  contracts  awarded  by  other  states  to the  two  principal
competing  contractors, Lockheed Martin and Electronic Data Systems.  Fearful that
up to 15,000 state jobs might be eliminated and that kiosks  would be used to serve
welfare recipients,  state anti-poverty groups opposed the state proposal.  The Texas
legislature,  prior to  final  congressional  passage  of the  BBA,  passed  legislation
requiring legislative oversight and public input of any privatization plan.  Ultimately,
the concerns raised by local groups with the Texas legislature, coupled with pressure
from the unions  and the administration  in Washington, caused the proposal to lose
momentum in the final stretch and it was not included in the BBA.
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programs to the states,  a number of states are now passing the responsibility down
to counties  and other local governmental  entities.  The most recent example of this
devolution occurred in North Carolina, where the state legislature gave authority to
30 counties to determine the level of cash welfare benefits, the eligibility criteria, and
the work requirements for poor families applying for welfare.  Advocates for the poor
must now marshal  their  resources  to  monitor and  attempt to  influence  program
development  and  implementation,  not only  at the  state  level but also at  the local
level.
Research  is  Critical
Where does the safety net stand today?  Let's look at the benefit reductions in
the Food Stamp Program, the program retained to provide a federal social safety net.
Under welfare reform, 6.7 million families with children will receive $430 less in food
stamp  benefits  in  1998  than  they would  have received if welfare  reform  had  not
occurred.  The 1.76 million families with elderly members will receive $165 less in food
stamp benefits.  In 1998, food stamp households with incomes below half the poverty
line will lose an average of $650 per year in food stamp benefits.  Most legal immigrants
lost eligibility for food stamp benefits on August 22,  1997.
Comprehensive research is vital to learn the full impact of welfare  reform on
low income families.  Research is critical to determine if  program improvements are
necessary and to decide what those improvements should be.  Most of those involved
with the effort to develop our new welfare policy would agree that, with time, we will
learn which changes have been successful and which will require modification.
To maximize the effort to help move poor individuals and families to positions
of self-sufficiency,  we must know why some succeed and others fail.  If the welfare
reform initiative is to be maintained, research studying the impact of welfare reform
on recipients, former recipients, and those who would have been eligible had welfare
reform  not made  them ineligible must be conducted so that improvements  can be
made to maximize the benefits of welfare reform. To effectively monitor the reform
effort and respond appropriately to calls for improvements, policy makers must have
access to the best possible data and not be forced to rely on anecdotal  evidence.
What  is Next?
The  next challenge  for the  states, the  Congress and  the administration  is to
ensure that welfare reform works, that those not working get jobs that will make them
self-sufficient, and that the cycle of poverty is broken for millions of poor households.
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given a strong economy.  Many argue that such people would have found work even
without welfare reform.  Indeed, it has been suggested that the twenty-five percent
reduction in the welfare rolls since early 1994 is not the result of  welfare reform but,
rather, is the result of the  strengthening economy.
It is unlikely that welfare reform will work for those with no skills, with mental
disabilities  and health  problems,  and with poor work habits.  It  is likely  that  the
welfare rolls will again  swell when the  economy weakens  and jobs become  more
scarce.
What,  if anything,  is the  responsibility of the various  levels of government
toward those who fall through the safety  net through no fault of their own?  Only
time can tell how we will answer that question.
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